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Introduction 
David M. Cutler 
Most industries in the United States comprise either for-profit firms, not- 
for-profit firms, or government enterprises. For-profits predominate in 
manufacturing, for example, while higher education is almost entirely not- 
for-profit (at least for four-year colleges) and elementary education is al- 
most exclusively public. The hospital industry, however, includes a mix of 
the three modes of production. In 1995, 65 percent of acute care hospital 
beds were in private not-for-profit institutions, 24 percent were in public 
institutions, and 1  1 percent were in for-profit institutions. Indeed, not-for- 
profit, for-profit, and government hospitals provide similar services and 
compete in the same markets. Not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals, for 
example, engage in joint ventures, and firms of one organization form have 
subsidiaries of another form. 
In recent years, the hospital market has been in a state of flux. Techno- 
logical innovation and the spread of managed care have led to striking 
reductions in inpatient demand. Between 1980 and 1995, hospital days in 
the United States fell by  35 percent, when the population was both grow- 
ing and growing older. In response to such large demand reductions, the 
number of  independent, acute care hospitals fell from 6,102 in  1980 to 
5,258 in 1995, a decline of 14 percent. Further, many remaining hospitals 
merged with other hospitals, cut their inpatient capacity, or converted sta- 
tus (primarily to for-profit form). Between  1980 and  1995, 263 not-for- 
profit hospitals (5  percent of  the  1980 number) converted to for-profit 
form. 
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These changes raise two fundamental questions: (1) What determines a 
hospital’s choice of for-profit or not-for-profit organizational form? and 
(2) How does that form affect patients and society? 
The Choice of Organizational Form 
What determines a hospital’s organizational  form-for-profit,  private 
not-for-profit, or government? The answer is in some part historical. Many 
not-for-profit  hospitals,  for example, were  founded  by  religious orders 
and have remained not-for-profit because of religious affiliation. There is 
more to the story, however, than just history. Hospitals do not always re- 
tain their historical form; they sometimes convert from one organizational 
form to another (including hospitals founded by religious institutions). 
Several nonhistorical factors may explain the choice of organizational 
form. One factor is profits. Public and private not-for-profit hospitals can, 
of course, earn a profit. These institutions may not, however, pay out their 
profits to a residual claimant. When fund balances are high, hospitals may 
decide to convert to for-profit form so that future profits can be paid out. 
Increased profits may also convince hospitals to remain in not-for-profit 
status, however, because not-for-profit hospitals frequently use profits to 
finance activities that managers  or boards of directors consider impor- 
tant-uncompensated  care, teaching, and medical research. 
Organizational form  also  determines access to  financing.  For-profit 
firms have  access to different financial  instruments  than  not-for-profit 
firms, since they can use equity financing. Equity capital is most readily 
available to hospitals affiliated with large for-profit corporations. Not-for- 
profit hospitals may decide to convert to for-profit form if they have ex- 
hausted their ability to issue tax-exempt debt and other available instru- 
ments and still need working capital. 
A final theory of organizational form is information signaling. Medical 
care is rife with information imperfections. It is difficult for patients to 
identify valuable procedures before they become sick, and patients often 
have little time to do so after they become sick. Thus, information imper- 
fections often force patients to trust that providers will provide high qual- 
ity medical care. But what ensures that providers will not skimp on care? 
For-profit firms might skimp more than not-for-profit firms, if  skimping 
raises profits without harming business. Not-for-profit hospitals, in con- 
trast, may have less incentive to skimp on care since they do not have 
shareholders who demand the highest possible returns. Thus, organiza- 
tional form may provide a way  to signal quality to imperfectly informed 
consumers. David M. Cutler  3 
The Implications of Organizational Choice 
These explanations for the choice between for-profit and not-for-profit 
form have different implications for the appropriateness of and society’s 
views about not-for-profit and for-profit institutions. 
Organizational choice affects public sector budgets. The effect is easily 
recognized in the case of public hospitals, which are part of government 
budgets. Private not-for-profit  organizations also affect public revenues, 
since they are exempt from federal and state corporate income taxes and 
local property taxes. This lost revenue has not gone unnoticed. Proposals 
have periodically been made to eliminate the favorable tax treatment of 
private not-for-profit institutions, particularly when they are not seen as 
providing substantial public goods. 
Further, hospitals have substantial indirect effects on government bud- 
gets. Hospitals provide a number of public goods that are generally associ- 
ated with governments, including caring for the uninsured, training med- 
ical residents, and facilitating medical research. Traditionally, hospitals 
have financed these  activities by  charging more  than marginal  cost  to 
people with insurance. The “tax” on those with insurance offsets the cost 
of the “public goods.” By financing these activities privately, the costs of 
these public goods are kept off of the public budget. 
Not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals may differ in their willingness to 
provide public goods. Government hospitals are frequently hospitals of 
last resort for the very poor. Public goods provision may also be a specific 
objective of private not-for-profit hospitals; not-for-profit hospitals have 
mission statements and charters commonly enumerating the public goods 
as goals. For-profit hospitals are unlikely to value public goods directly, 
however, or at best, the relationship would be indirect-provide  public 
goods if needed, but minimize the amount of provision if possible. Thus, 
as hospitals move from one organizational form to another, the amount 
of privately provided public goods may change, and that change has impli- 
cations for patient health and public budgets. 
In addition, the choice of organizational form may affect the quality of 
medical care for insured people. As noted above, for-profit hospitals have 
greater incentives to skimp on patient care than do not-for-profit hospi- 
tals, if skimping on care is hard to detect and thus does not result in the 
hospital receiving an adverse reputation or being sued. On the other hand, 
greater pay may lead to better managerial ability in for-profit than in not- 
for-profit hospitals, potentially leading to better outcomes. Medical care 
is a complex activity, requiring precise coordination of physicians, nurses, 
and hospital facilities. A well-run organization is likely to have much bet- 
ter outcomes than does a poorly run organization, and high pay might 
motivate organizations to be more efficient. 
Concerns about quality  and the potential  loss of public goods have 4  Introduction 
weighed  heavily in the public sector. In response, some states have made 
it difficult for for-profit hospitals to enter. And not-for-profit hospital man- 
agers frequently feed this perception, arguing that quality will suffer if for- 
profit hospitals become dominant. 
Given the dramatic recent changes in the hospital industry and these 
substantial policy questions, it is important to consider the role of not- 
for-profit hospitals in the medical care system. The papers in this volume 
present such an examination, focusing on the two issues discussed above: 
the choice between for-profit and not-for-profit organizational form and 
the implications of this choice for patients and society. 
Hospital Conversions to For-Profit Form 
The first set of  papers examines the reasons for hospital conversions 
from not-for-profit to for-profit status and the purchase prices paid for 
converting hospitals. In a case study of  10 hospital conversions that oc- 
curred in North Carolina and South Carolina since 1981, Frank A. Sloan, 
Donald H. Taylor, and Christopher Conover investigate whether commu- 
nities receive a fair price when selling a hospital. For their analysis, the 
authors obtained detailed information about hospital purchase prices, the 
use of the funds received, and the commitments made by  the buyers to 
the local communities. They calculate appropriate prices under different 
assumptions about future cash flows and take into account any commu- 
nity benefits that are not reflected in the transaction  price. To estimate 
these benefits, they use parameter estimates from regression analyses of 
Tennessee hospital conversions. 
They conclude that for-profit hospital corporations  paid a price sub- 
stantially above the fair price to acquire not-for-profit hospitals. Interest- 
ingly, the authors find the reverse when communities transact with not- 
for-profit or government organizations. Finally, they find that hospitals 
that convert to for-profit status do not reduce their provision of commu- 
nity benefits. Because the authors examine a limited time horizon, they 
acknowledge that these for-profit facilities may behave quite differently in 
the years ahead. The authors also suggest that further research needs to 
be done on the social benefits associated with the foundations formed as 
a result of hospital conversions. 
In the second chapter, David M. Cutler and Jill R. Horwitz also use a 
case-study approach to explain why two not-for-profit hospitals converted 
to for-profit status and identify the effects of the conversions. They study 
two large hospitals that both converted more than a decade ago, allow- 
ing the authors to examine both the short- and long-term consequences 
of these conversions. For their analysis, Cutler and Horwitz use several 
sources of information, including interviews with hospital personnel, news- 
paper articles, Medicare cost reports, and legal documents. David M. Cutler  5 
Their results suggest two primary motivations for conversions to for- 
profit status. The first is a financial one-not-for-profit  hospitals with sub- 
stantial amounts of debt may convert to gain access to cheaper sources of 
capital. Second, the culture of a not-for-profit hospital can have an impor- 
tant effect on the decision to convert, as hospitals run by  businessmen 
may be much more likely than religiously affiliated or physician-run hospi- 
tals to convert. Their findings also show that the conversions have im- 
proved the financial performance of these hospitals by  cutting hospital 
costs and by increasing public sector reimbursement. The authors suggest 
that this second factor is due to skillful exploitation of Medicare loopholes 
by  for-profit hospitals. Finally, they find that nearby not-for-profit hos- 
pitals also begin to game the Medicare program after entry by a for-profit 
hospital. The authors suggest that future research in this area should exam- 
ine the effect of not-for-profit hospital conversions on medical care quality. 
Medical Care Quality in For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations 
The second group of papers examines quality differences between for- 
profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Medical care quality has historically 
been difficult to measure. There are several reasons for this. First, it is 
difficult to identify the relevant measures of quality. A complete measure 
would include patient  health,  satisfaction, and process of  care, among 
other factors. Second, until quite recently there were no reliable data sets 
that gave detailed information about long-term health outcomes for a sub- 
stantial share of the population. Third, because of inadequate information 
about the mix of patients at different hospitals, it was difficult to know if 
differences across facilities in health outcomes were due to hospital quality 
or differences in patient mix. Finally, measures of health outcomes, partic- 
ularly when comparing individual facilities  within a market, are quite noisy. 
As a result, the papers in this section of the volume take a number of 
approaches to measuring hospital quality. Improving significantly upon 
previous work in this area, Mark McClellan and Douglas Staiger use a 
generalized method-of-moments (GMM) framework to compare quality 
at for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. The authors use a data set that 
contains all elderly Medicare beneficiaries who were (1) hospitalized from 
1984 through  1994 following their first heart  attack (acute myocardial 
infarction, or AMI) or (2) hospitalized with ischemic heart disease (IHD) 
from 1984 through  1991. The authors use 90-day mortality as their out- 
come measure, and emphasize that the severity of AM1 and IHD limits 
the scope for selection across hospitals and thus enables them to more 
precisely estimate differences in hospital quality. Moreover, because the 
outcome measures are noisy estimates of hospital quality, the authors use 
data from many years to construct filtered risk-adjusted mortality rates 
(RAMRs) for each hospital. 6  Introduction 
Their results suggest that (1) there is a strong negative relationship be- 
tween  hospital  volume and mortality  rates,  (2) not-for-profit hospitals 
have lower mortality than both for-profit and government hospitals, and 
(3) differences in mortality rates between not-for-profit and for-profit hos- 
pitals increased between 1985 and 1994. The authors conclude with case 
studies of three counties and find evidence that, within a market, for-profit 
hospitals actually have higher quality than do not-for-profit hospitals. The 
small average difference in mortality rates between not-for-profit and for- 
profit hospitals that the authors uncover, coupled with the large variation 
within each hospital type, suggests that there may be other factors that 
affect hospital quality and are significantly more important than owner- 
ship type. 
After suffering from an acute, emergency condition, many individuals’ 
first contact with the health care system is not the hospital but the emer- 
gency 911 system that helps to get them to the facility. Because previous 
research has shown that the time between the onset of an emergency con- 
dition and the initiation of  appropriate medical procedures can have an 
important effect on mortality for certain conditions, it may  be the case 
that changes in funding for 91 1 systems lead to substantial changes in av- 
erage health outcomes. Moreover, the quality of the response system may 
have an important effect on the appropriate choice of medical care inputs 
for nearby hospitals. 
Susan Athey and Scott Stern explore the causes and effects of differ- 
ences across communities in prehospital and in-hospital emergency ser- 
vices. Initially, the authors use a data set with every ambulance ride in 
Pennsylvania during 1995 to explore the direct productivity benefits that 
arise when a community adopts a basic or advanced 91 1 system. Focusing 
on cases of cardiac incident, they find that both the time to reach an emer- 
gency site and the time that elapses from the site to the hospital is decreas- 
ing in the adoption of advanced 91 1 services. However, there is little evi- 
dence to suggest that mortality rates from cardiac incidents are related to 
the adoption of 91 1 services. 
Next, the authors investigate the effect of 91 1 systems on both the allo- 
cation of patients across hospitals and the adoption of cardiac technolog- 
ies by hospitals. They find that a hospital’s level of cardiac technology has 
an important effect on its share of cardiac patients within a market, but 
little evidence that the 91 1 system influences hospitals’ technology invest- 
ments. Finally, using a national-level data set on the adoption of 91 1 tech- 
nologies across communities, the authors analyze the determinants of 91 1 
adoption by communities. They find that places with a more conservative 
political orientation are less likely to adopt advanced 91 1 systems and that 
state legislation governing the adoption of 91 1 has an important effect on 
communities’ adoption decisions. 
Previous authors have shown that  health care practice patterns vary David M. Cutler  7 
significantly across geographic areas within the United States. Jonathan 
Skinner and John E. Wennberg use this variation to investigate the pro- 
ductive and allocative efficiency of end-of-life medical care. The authors 
compare Medicare expenditures and physician visits in the last six months 
of life across communities in the United States. Initially, the authors focus 
on Miami and Minneapolis and find that average Medicare costs are sub- 
stantially higher (by approximately a two-to-one margin) in Miami. Find- 
ing that the variation is even larger for intensive medical care, they ascribe 
much of  the variation in expenditures to differences in the treatment of 
the chronically ill in the two areas. 
Next, the authors conduct a cross-sectional analysis of the 306 hospital 
referral regions in the United States, and they find that the variation in 
end-of-life medical spending does not appear to be driven by  differences 
in underlying health status across areas. The authors then explore whether 
the additional spending in  certain areas leads to improved health  out- 
comes, as measured by  mortality rates. They find no evidence that the 
areas with relatively high expenditures have better health outcomes than 
do those areas with significantly lower spending. Finally, the authors argue 
that patients frequently prefer less intensive treatment than physicians ad- 
vocate, identifying another potential source of inefficiency in the provision 
of medical care. 
Previous research suggests that recent changes in the health care mar- 
ketplace have forced not-for-profit hospitals to behave quite similarly to 
their  for-profit counterparts. As  inpatient  demand  has  fallen, not-for- 
profit hospitals have diversified into other activities and entered into joint 
ventures with for-profit firms. Richard G. Frank and David S. Salkever ex- 
plore the causes and effects of this recent diversification of activities, and 
its implications for charitable giving and care to the poor. The authors re- 
port on the results of three focus group discussions with executives from 
14 (mainly not-for-profit) hospitals in Boston and Chicago, and they use 
these results in constructing a model of not-for-profit hospital diversifica- 
tion and charitable giving. 
They find that nonteaching not-for-profit hospitals diversify their activi- 
ties and enter into joint ventures not only to offset reductions in inpatient 
revenues but also to gain market share, strengthen ties with physicians, 
and reduce the uncertainty in demand for care. Their focus group discus- 
sions revealed that philanthropy constitutes a very  small share (approxi- 
mately 1  percent) of a typical not-for-profit hospital’s budget, and suggest 
that these private donations fall when a hospital’s financial performance 
improves. Frank and Salkever find no evidence that diversification or a de- 
cline in private donations has reduced the supply of public goods (i.e., char- 
ity care) by  not-for-profit hospitals. This may  be due to not-for-profits’ 
success in keeping their profits relatively high, allowing them to continue 
to cross-subsidize care for unprofitable patients. 8  Introduction 
Managed Care and Hospital Quality 
The third part of the book focuses directly on the relationship between 
managed care and hospital quality. As noted above, managed care has 
fundamentally changed the medical care landscape. Thus, determining its 
effect on hospital operations is a central problem in health economics re- 
search. 
Using a unique approach and a rich data set, Sarah Feldman and David 
Scharfstein compare the quality of care received by  cancer patients in- 
sured by fee-for-service and managed care insurers. They use provider vol- 
ume as a proxy for quality, taking the result from many previous studies 
that the patients of high-volume physicians and hospitals have better clini- 
cal outcomes than do other patients. They use a data set containing all 
Massachusetts hospital discharges in 1995 (including physician identifiers 
for each discharge) to compare the providers of fee-for-service and man- 
aged care patients with breast cancer, colorectal cancer, and gynecologic 
cancer. The authors choose these three types of cancer because they are 
typically treated surgically, and thus there are unlikely to be significant 
differences in the type of treatments received by fee-for-service and man- 
aged care patients. 
The authors find that managed care patients tend to be treated by physi- 
cians who perform relatively fewer surgeries, and that these patients re- 
ceive their treatment in lower-volume hospitals. The differences across the 
seven managed care plans are substantial, with one of the plans actually 
sending their patients to higher volume providers than the fee-for-service 
providers. Furthermore, their results suggest that there is substantial vari- 
ation in quality within a typical managed care plan, as some plans appear 
to offer higher quality care for one type of cancer than for another. The 
authors conclude that, if provider volume is an accurate measure of qual- 
ity, then managed care plans may  indeed offer lower quality health care 
than fee-for-service plans. 
The second paper in this section aims to explain how insurance status 
affects the type of care that an individual receives within a particular in- 
stitution. David Meltzer, Frederick L. Hiltz, and David Bates use a case- 
study approach to analyze the effect of a managed care institution on the 
type of care provided in a large academic medical center. They use data 
on all admissions to the teaching hospital’s internal medicine service over 
a one-and-a-half-year period to investigate the effect of the attending phy- 
sician’s financial incentives on the costs of care. Within the hospital, some 
attendings are employed by the managed care organization (MCO) while 
all others are employed by  the hospital. The MCO attendings, whose pa- 
tients are almost all MCO patients, have much stronger financial incen- 
tives to reduce costs than do the physicians employed by the hospital. 
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significantly lower costs than do similar patients  of hospital-employed 
physicians.  The majority  of  this  cost  saving  is  accomplished  through 
shorter lengths-of-stay. The authors also find that physician workload has 
a significant effect on patient discharge probabilities, and they suggest that 
hospitals may increase their attending physicians’ incentives to discharge 
patients quickly by  reducing their house staff rather than through actual 
financial incentives. Both of these papers build substantially on previous 
research concerning the effects of managed care on health care quality. 
Taxation and Information 
The final section of the volume examines the tax implications of the 
difference between not-for-profit and for-profit ownership and the signal- 
ing value of different forms of ownership. As noted above, the differential 
tax treatment received by not-for-profit hospitals has attracted consider- 
able recent attention, as many health care analysts claim that these facili- 
ties are behaving no differently from their for-profit counterparts. Using 
a detailed data set on the financial status of not-for-profit hospitals, Wil- 
liam M. Gentry and John R. Penrod estimate the magnitude of these tax 
benefits. Not-for-profit hospitals are exempt from corporate income taxes 
(federal and state) and property taxes (state and local), have access to tax- 
exempt bond financing, and can receive charitable donations that are tax 
deductible for the donor. 
Using data from the Health Care Financing Administration’s 1995 pub- 
lic use file of Medicare cost reports, the authors estimate that the income 
tax exemption is worth $4.6 billion to not-for-profit hospitals while the 
value of their property tax exemption is $I  .6 billion. Additionally, the au- 
thors’ results suggest that the net benefit of access to tax-exempt bonds is 
quite small and does not significantly reduce the cost of borrowing for 
not-for-profit  hospitals. The authors note, however, that if not-for-profit 
hospitals engage in tax arbitrage by borrowing at tax-exempt interest rates 
and investing in financial assets with greater returns, the magnitude of this 
benefit could be substantial. Data limitations prevent  the authors from 
carefully estimating the value of the tax deduction  for charitable gifts. 
However, their preliminary analysis of cost report data reveals that these 
contributions are substantial only for a small number of hospitals, with 
44 percent of all not-for-profit hospitals having zero charitable contribu- 
tions in 1995. 
Finally, Tomas Philipson  examines whether  consumers are willing to 
pay significantly higher prices for not-for-profit nursing home care than 
for similar care in for-profit facilities. If not-for-profit nursing homes solve 
the asymmetric information problem between consumers and producers 
better than their  for-profit counterparts, these two types of institutions 
are not perfect substitutes. More specifically, not-for-profit nursing homes 10  Introduction 
should sell at a premium because consumers would value the not-for-profit 
status more highly. 
Using data from the U.S. National Nursing Home Surveys in 1985 and 
1995, Philipson finds no support for the presence of  a not-for-profit pre- 
mium. Instead, he finds a 5 percent for-profit premium in 1985 and no sig- 
nificant difference in price in 1995. These results suggest that there is per- 
fect substitution on the demand side between not-for-profit and for-profit 
production, and that asymmetric information is relatively less important 
in health care markets than many economists have previously suggested. 
Finally, Philipson points out that future theoretical work on the effect of 
organizational form within the health care market should aim to explain 
why  the hospital market is served mainly by not-for-profit firms while the 
nursing home market is dominated by for-profit facilities. 
A Concluding Thought 
The economics of the hospital industry are changing rapidly and dra- 
matically. Reduced demand, lower profit margins, and more intense com- 
petition make the hospital industry of today very different from the hospi- 
tal industry of the past. 
Already, the changes in the industry have reached the public sector. An- 
titrust policy has been forced to evaluate the costs and benefits of hospital 
mergers. Tax policy has to consider the revenue consequences of different 
organizational forms. And perceptions that care for the uninsured will suf- 
fer as the industry changes will  place pressure on public hospitals and 
public insurance programs. 
The demands for economic analysis are great. The papers in this vol- 
ume, and the subsequent research they are certain to stimulate, will have 
enormous implications for public policy toward this vital industry. 